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Individuals with a repressive coping style self-report low anxiety, but show high defen-
siveness and high physiological arousal. Repressors have impoverished negative autobio-
graphical memories and are better able to suppress memory for negatively valenced and
self-related laboratory materials when asked to do so. Research on spontaneous forget-
ting of negative information in repressors suggests that they show significant forgetting
of negative items, but only after a delay. Unknown is whether increased forgetting after
a delay is potentiated by self-relevance. Here we asked in three experiments whether
repressors would show reduced episodic memories for negative self-relevant information
when tested immediately versus after a 2-day delay. We predicted that repressors would
show an exaggerated reduction in recall of negative self-relevant memories after a delay, at
least without anew priming of this information. We tested a total of 300 participants (exper-
iment 1: N =95, experiment 2: N =106; experiment 3: N =99) of four types: repressors,
high-anxious (HA), low-anxious, and defensive HA individuals. Participants judged positive
and negative adjectives with regard to self-descriptiveness, serving as incidental encoding.
Surprise free-recall was conducted immediately after encoding (experiment 1), after a 2-
day delay (experiment 2), or after a 2-day delay following priming via a lexical decision task
(experiment 3). In experiment 1, repressors showed a bias against negative self-relevant
words in immediate recall. Such a bias was neither observed in delayed recall without prim-
ing nor in delayed recall with priming.Thus, counter to our hypothesis, negative information
that was initially judged as self-relevant was not forgotten at a higher rate after a delay in
repressors. We suggest that repressors may reinterpret initially negative information in a
more positive light after a delay, and therefore no longer experience the need to bias their
recall after a delay.
Keywords: memory, repressive coping style, self-relevance, delay, valence
INTRODUCTION
Repression is a putative psychological defense mechanism (Freud,
1957/1915) that inhibits anxiety-provoking, ego-threatening
thoughts from entering consciousness. Debated for over a cen-
tury, there has been little empirical evidence for the existence of
repression, either as a trauma-specific or a general mechanism
of forgetting (Erdelyi, 2006). An alternative is to measure differ-
ences between individuals’ repressive tendencies. The most studied
approach by Weinberger et al. (1979) defines “repressors” as indi-
viduals who score high on self-report measures of defensiveness
and low in measures of trait-anxiety. Thus, scores in two ques-
tionnaires are combined, trait-anxiety and trait-defensiveness. As
a consequence, three additional groups of individuals are iden-
tified: “Low-anxious (LA)” individuals score low in trait-anxiety
and low in trait-defensiveness. These are thought to be people with
“truly” low anxiety since they do not respond defensively in ques-
tionnaires, unlike repressors. “High-anxious (HA)” individuals
score low in defensiveness but high in trait-anxiety; and “defensive
HA” individuals have high scores on both scales. A crucial finding
is that repressors exhibit physiologically high levels of anxiety-
related arousal despite their low self-reported anxiety (Weinberger
et al., 1979; Broomfield and Turpin, 2005). Thus, by this opera-
tional definition, repressors have high levels of unacknowledged
anxiety. Importantly, repressive coping style has been associated
with deleterious effects on physical well-being, most consistently
an increased risk for hypertension, cardiovascular diseases, and
cancer (Mund and Mitte, 2012).
The motivation to maintain a positive self-view and avoid the
experience of anxiety may drive repressors more than others to
truncate, inhibit, or otherwise alter negative information process-
ing. Indeed, repressors show biases against processing negative
information. For example, compared to non-repressors, repressors
recall fewer and less detailed negative autobiographical memo-
ries (e.g., Davis and Schwartz, 1987; Davis, 1990; Dickson et al.,
2009; Geraerts et al., 2012). When directly instructed to inhibit
processing of negative information, repressors are superior to
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non-repressors in (negative) thought suppression (Barnier et al.,
2004; Geraerts et al., 2006,2007). Repressors’superior inhibition of
negative information has also been shown in memory. For exam-
ple, repressors had increased forgetting of negative self-related
materials in list-method directed forgetting paradigms (Myers
et al., 1998; Myers and Derakshan, 2004). They were also better
able to perform the think/no-think task (Anderson and Green,
2001) than non-repressors, at least when they were given posi-
tive target memories to recall instead of negative ones (Hertel and
McDaniel, 2010). Thus, active inhibition of negative, and espe-
cially, self-relevant memories may play a role in repressors’selective
forgetting of information in experimental contexts in which they
are told to forget.
Repressors’ naturally occurring, uninstructed forgetting of lab-
oratory materials has been more variable. Brosschot et al. (1997)
found nothing remarkable about repressors’ free-recall and recog-
nition of unpleasant (and pleasant) words. Similarly, Oldenburg
et al. (2002) found neither implicit nor explicit memory biases
against negative materials in repressors. Avero et al. (2003) found
that individuals with an avoidant coping style (similar to the
repressive coping style) had a more conservative response bias
(β) but intact recognition sensitivity (d-prime) in recognition
memory for negative words than other people. That is, repressors
compared to non-repressors judged negative words (both target
words and lure words) less often as “old items” in a recognition
memory test, even though their ability to differentiate successfully
between negative target words and negative lure words was intact.
Focussing on self-related information rather than just valenced
materials, Saunders et al. (2012) found in a series of studies that
repressors are most susceptible to the mnemic neglect effect (Green
and Sedikides, 2004; Green et al., 2008) compared to individuals
with other coping styles. In mnemic neglect studies, participants
are exposed to hypothetical scenarios that involve either them-
selves or a different person. These scenarios imply favorable or
unfavorable personality traits (e.g., “I would keep secrets when
asked to”) with different importance to people’s self-concept and
different modifiability. In general, a “mnemic neglect” is reflected
in reduced recall of situations that involve the self, and unfavorable,
personally important, and unmodifiable characteristics. Repres-
sors in Saunders et al. (2012) showed the strongest such mnemic
neglect effects in a series of three experiments. Thus, personal
involvement or significance, in addition to negative valence might
be important to evoke spontaneous, i.e., unprovoked, memory
biases in repressive individuals.
Hock, Krohne, and colleagues (Hock and Krohne, 2004; Krohne
and Hock, 2008, 2011; Peters et al., 2012) define and measure
repressive coping style using the Mainz Coping Inventory (MCI:
Krohne and Egloff, 1989; Krohne et al., 2000). The MCI does not
rely on the combination of defensiveness and anxiety but incor-
porates individual differences in information processing styles.
MCI-repressors are thought to be motivated to control their expe-
rience of anxiety-related arousal and characterized by high dispo-
sitional threat avoidance. Their most extreme counterpart, sensi-
tizers, are thought to be motivated to control potential dangers
resulting from fearful situations. Therefore, MCI-based sensitizers
are thought to be uncertainty-oriented and show high disposi-
tional threat vigilance. Using this operationalization, repressors
were found to show no biases against threat-related informa-
tion in immediate retrieval (recognition memory for negative
words/sentences or pictures), but those biases emerged only when
testing was delayed by three days (Hock and Krohne, 2004; Krohne
and Hock, 2008; see also Peters et al., 2012). This pattern has
also been termed repressive discontinuity hypothesis indicating that
repressors may have an early attentional bias toward threat but
selectively retain non-threat and forget threat-information later
on (Calvo and Eysenck, 2000; Caldwell and Newman, 2005; Der-
akshan et al., 2007; Paul et al., 2012). Krohne and Hock (2011)
suggested based on the schema pointer plus tag model of Graesser
and Bower (1990) that retrieval may co-vary with the level of atypi-
cality of memories. According to this model, schema-incongruent
information is better recalled at immediate testing and schema-
congruent information is better recalled at delayed testing. If
repressors have fewer threat-schemata than non-repressors, they
should effectively retrieve threat-information immediately, but
have reduced recall of (schema-incongruent) threat-related infor-
mation at a delayed test. This is consistent with their findings
(Hock and Krohne, 2004; Krohne and Hock, 2008; Peters et al.,
2012).
If the main motivation of a repressive coping style is self-
protection, one would expect to see decreased memory predomi-
nantly in tasks that require relating negative thoughts and memo-
ries to oneself (Myers and Derakshan, 2004; Saunders et al., 2012).
Consequently, it seems likely that differences in personal involve-
ment evoked by particular tasks may have contributed to the vari-
ability of the aforementioned results. For instance, the null findings
of Brosschot et al. (1997) may have been due to participants sim-
ply rating stimuli for pleasantness and threat, a task that can be
performed with minimal reference to oneself. Along this line, Fuji-
wara et al. (2008) also found no alterations in repressors’ recall or
priming for negative information they had judged for valence.
In contrast, within the same study, self-descriptiveness judgments
critically mediated forgetting in repressors: non-repressors had
better free-recall of negative self-descriptive words compared
to negative non-self-descriptive words. In contrast, repressors
showed no such free-recall benefit for negative self-descriptive
information. Despite these group differences in free-recall, implicit
memory (priming) for negative self-descriptive information was
similar across groups. Thus, self-descriptiveness mediated free-
recall (but not priming) biases against negative information even
at an immediate test in our previous study. However, unknown
is whether such self-serving rather than just valence-driven bias
would become stronger over time.
Thus, we compared here whether repressive coping style medi-
ated free-recall of words previously judged as self-descriptive at an
immediate test (conceptual replication of Fujiwara et al., 2008),
and at a delayed test. First, we expected to replicate our previ-
ous result and predicted that all groups but repressors should
show a recall advantage of negative self-descriptive over nega-
tive information that was not self-descriptive in immediate test
(experiment 1). Secondly, we expected that these immediate biases
would become more pronounced with a delay (experiment 2).
Thus, if schema-congruency drives delayed retrieval more so than
immediate retrieval and repressors possess fewer negative self-
schemata than non-repressors, repressors may retrieve even less
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negative self-descriptive information after a delay than immedi-
ately. Finally, we tested whether potential recall biases at delayed
testing could be influenced by cueing all original materials prior
to free-recall using a lexical decision task (experiment 3). Based on
autobiographical memory work by Davis and others (Davis and
Schwartz, 1987; Davis, 1990), who showed that repressors can be
cued to retrieve negative autobiographical information that they
did not report otherwise, we expected that repressors may not
show conceivable biases against recalling negative self-descriptive
information if they had been cued immediately prior to free-recall
at the delayed test. We did not expect repressor-specific alterations
of implicit memory in the lexical decision task after the delay. As
we reported previously (Fujiwara et al., 2008), priming for neg-
ative self-relevant information had been intact in repressors at
immediate test, and we did not expect this to change after a delay.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were a total of 351 introductory psychology students
at the University of Alberta. Participants gave written informed
consent prior to the study, which was approved by a University
of Alberta Research Ethics Board. In online mass-testing ses-
sions at the beginning of fall and winter semesters between 2007
and 2010, all students enrolled in an introductory psychology
course (between 1500 and 2500 students in each fall/winter term)
completed the Trait-version of the State-Trait-Anxiety Inventory
(STAI-T; Spielberger et al., 1983) and the Self-Deceptive Enhance-
ment (SDE) component of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable
Responding scale (BIDR; Paulhus, 1991), in this fixed order. The
STAI-T consists of 24-point scaled statements measuring trait-
anxiety (maximum score: 80). The BIDR-SDE consists of 27-point
scaled statements that measure self-deceptive aspects of social
desirability, such as beliefs of invincibility and exaggerated opti-
mism (maximum score: 140). Only native English speakers with
complete questionnaire and demographic data as well as below
30 years of age were included. Participants were categorized into
four coping styles according to Weinberger’s classification scheme
(Weinberger et al., 1979) based on quartile splits of BIDR-SDE
scores (cut-off: 74 and 92 points, for lowest and highest quartile
respectively) and median splits on STAI-T scores (43 points) of
the 1539 eligible students tested in the 2007 fall semester. Subse-
quent semesters used the same cut-off scores to ensure consistency
across samples. Participants in each semester were classified as
repressors (REP: low-anxious, high-defensive), truly low-anxious
(LA: low-anxious, low-defensive), truly high-anxious (HA: high-
anxious, low-defensive), and defensive high-anxious (DHA: high-
anxious, high-defensive). Based on the BIDR-SDE and STAI-T
cut-off scores, a first enrolment wave in each semester allowed
equally sized groups of participants with one of the four cop-
ing styles online access to self-enroll in the experiments. The size
of the groups that received access to the experiment was deter-
mined by the maximum number of participants in the smallest of
the four groups (usually, the DHA). Additional enrolment waves
were initiated when participation rates started to decline usually
around midway through the semesters, giving more participants
access to the experiment. These participants were usually more
REP and HA as these two groups were more common than LA
and especially than DHA. Students were not aware of the nature
of the experiment at the time of self-enrolment and testers were
not aware of the participants’ coping style at the time of the
experiment. In experiment 1, 99 students participated, 122 stu-
dents participated in experiment 2, and 130 in experiment 3. Data
from 52 participants were excluded: 22 had partial data or oth-
erwise did not comply with the task instructions (e.g., less than
50% valid trials, less than two words in free-recall), 19 did not
return after the delay to complete the experiment, 3 experienced
a computer error, and 8 participants’ pre-selection questionnaire
data were erroneous.
The final sample in experiment 1 included 95 participants. A
total of 22 (15 female) LA, 26 (13 female) HA, 28 (14 female)
REP, and 19 (11 female) DHA individuals participated, with an
average age of 20.02± 1.77 years. Gender was equally distributed
across groups [χ2(3)= 2.14, p> 0.1]. The final sample in exper-
iment 2 included 106 participants. A total of 26 (21 female) LA,
26 (16 female) HA, 31 (14 female) REP, and 23 (14 female) DHA
individuals participated, with an average age of 19.00± 1.66 years.
Although there were slightly more female participants in the LA
group than in the other groups, the gender distribution was not
statistically different across all groups [χ2(3)= 7.56, p> 0.05].
Finally, experiment 3 included 99 participants. A total of 27
(16 female) LA, 28 (16 female) HA, 23 (10 female) REP, and
21 (14 female) DHA individuals participated, with an average
age of 18.86± 1.93 years. Gender was equally distributed across
groups [χ2(3)= 2.56, p> 0.1]. Participants’ questionnaire data
are summarized in Table 1.
As intended, in each experiment, anxiety (STAI-T) was signif-
icantly different across groups [experiment 1: F(3, 91)= 75.97;
experiment 2: F(3, 102)= 61.54; experiment 3: F(3, 95)= 89.91,
all p’s< 0.001], and so was defensiveness (BIDR-SDE) [exper-
iment 1: F(3, 91)= 292.81; experiment 2: F(3, 104)= 187;
Table 1 | Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of questionnaire
data across groups in all three experiments.
LA HA REP DHA
M SD M SD M SD M SD
EXPERIMENT 1
STAI-T 36.00a 2.88 53.00b 7.52 35.14a 3.58 51.47b 6.50
BIDR-SDE 69.90c 3.94 68.65c 4.76 99.04d 5.20 96.42d 4.85
EXPERIMENT 2
STAI-T 38.88a 3.51 50.92b 6.51 37.35a 2.20 48.13b 4.78
BIDR-SDE 70.87c 4.12 69.34c 8.09 96.42d 5.30 94.09d 3.06
EXPERIMENT 3
STAI-T 37.85a 3.03 48.82b 3.57 35.13a 2.69 48.05b 5.12
BIDR-SDE 70.85c 3.31 68.86c 4.45 98.82d 7.06 95.19d 4.24
STAI-T, trait-version of the State-Trait-Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1983);
BIDR-SDE, self-deceptive enhancement scale of the Balanced Inventory of Desir-
able Responding (Paulhus, 1991); LA, low-anxious; HA, high-anxious; REP, repres-
sor; DHA, defensive high-anxious. Cells with different superscripts show signif-
icant between-group differences within each experiment, indicated by post hoc
Scheffé test (p<0.001).
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experiment 3: F(3, 95)= 255.26, all p’s< 0.001]. Post hoc Scheffé
tests indicated higher anxiety in HA/DHA than in LA/REP groups,
but no differences between groups with high anxiety scores (HA,
DHA), or between groups with low anxiety scores (LA, REP).
Likewise, defensiveness was always substantially higher in groups
intended to have high defensiveness (REP, DHA) than in those
with low-defensiveness (LA, HA), but never differed between REP
and DHA or between LA and HA (all p’s< 0.001).
MATERIALS AND TASKS
Stimuli were personality trait words drawn from Anderson (1968).
Based on median splits of likeableness, we created two matched
sets, each with 75 likeable and 75 non-likeable words (hereafter
termed “positive” and “negative,” respectively). Sets were equated
in word length (3–10 letters), statistical frequency, and meaning-
fulness (for details see Fujiwara et al., 2008). Half the participants
in each experiment received set 1 or set 2 during the encoding task.
The unused words (i.e., either set 1 or set 2, depending on its use
in the encoding task) were included in experiment 3 as new words
in the lexical decision task. The fixed task order was as follows:
experiment 1: self-referential judgments, free-recall. Experiment
2: self-referential judgments, 2-day delay, free-recall. Experiment
3: self-referential judgments, 2-day delay, lexical decision task,
free-recall.
Encoding task
Participants were presented with 150 personality trait words
(75 positive, 75 negative). Participants were asked to judge
how descriptive each word was of themselves, on a four-point
scale:“1”= very self-descriptive,“2”=moderately self-descriptive,
“3”=moderately not-self-descriptive, and “4”= not at all self-
descriptive. In each trial, a fixation cross appeared for 500 ms,
followed by a centrally presented word (3000 ms) at which time
participants would make their self-descriptiveness rating. Six prac-
tice trials were given. Eight filler words were presented at the end
of the task to avoid recency effects. Practice and filler words were
excluded from the analyses. Dependent variables were the propor-
tions of word judgments, summarized into composite measures
described in more detail in Section “Statistical Analyses.”
Free-recall
Participants were given 5 minutes to write on a piece of paper in
any order as many words as they could recall from the encoding
task. The dependent variable was the proportion of words recalled.
Lexical decision task (experiment 3 only)
Participants were presented the 150 words they had judged in
the encoding task, 150 new words (either word set 1 or set 2,
see above), as well as 300 pronounceable non-word letter strings.
Participants were asked to judge each letter string as a word or a
non-word. Speed and accuracy were emphasized equally. Practice
trials contained six words and three non-words. None of them
were included in the experiment. Each trial had the following
sequence: a fixation cross would appear for 1000 ms followed by a
150-ms presentation of the letter string, after which the participant
had to respond (identical to Fujiwara et al., 2008). The dependent
variable was response time.
Except for free-recall, tasks were administered using Presenta-
tion software (www.neurobs.com) on laptop computers. Stimuli
were presented in light gray, 36-point Arial font in the center of
a black screen. All three experiments were conducted in small
groups of one to three participants at a time. Participants were
facing opposite walls to prevent them from watching each other
perform the tasks.
Statistical analyses
To avoid empty cells, self-descriptiveness judgments were col-
lapsed from four into two response categories. The judg-
ments “very self-descriptive” and “moderately self-descriptive”
were coded together as “self-descriptive”; “moderately not-self-
descriptive” and “not at all self-descriptive” judgments were coded
as “not-self-descriptive.”
As self-referential judgments are mutually exclusive (each word
can be judged as either self-descriptive or not, but not both),
we derived two composite measures to illustrate performance in
the encoding task. First, we calculated a “self-judgment ratio” by
dividing the proportion of all words judged as self-descriptive
by proportions of words judged as not-self-descriptive, and sub-
sequently log-transforming this ratio to make the distribution
symmetric. Positive scores indicate more self-descriptive than not-
self-descriptive judgments, regardless of valence. Secondly, we
calculated a “positivity-judgment ratio” by dividing the propor-
tion of favorable judgments (negative not-self-descriptive judg-
ments and positive self-descriptive judgments) by the propor-
tion of unfavorable judgments (negative self-descriptive judg-
ments and positive not-self-descriptive judgments), and log-
transforming this ratio. Positive scores indicate more favorable
self-judgments than unfavorable self-judgments. The two ratios
were compared with univariate ANOVA and between-subject fac-
tors anxiety (low/high) and defensiveness (low/high), separately
for all three experiments. Splitting up the two components com-
prising the coping styles (anxiety, defensiveness) allowed us to
investigate whether the interaction of anxiety and defensiveness
(i.e., the repressive coping style) influenced our results over and
above anxiety or defensiveness alone1. Free-recall and priming
effects were analyzed with mixed repeated-measures ANOVA sep-
arately for each of the three experiments, consistent with our
previous study (Fujiwara et al., 2008). Performance was calcu-
lated as proportions of words identified in priming or recalled
in free-recall relative to each individual’s total number of neg-
ative and positive self-descriptive or not-self-descriptive words
from the prior judgment task (possible maximum of 75 negative
and 75 positive words). Thus, the dependent variables: propor-
tional recall and priming were analyzed as a function of within-
subject factors valence (positive/negative) and prior self-judgment
from the encoding task (self-descriptive/not-self-descriptive).
1The grouping of individuals into one of the four coping styles (LA, HA, REP,
DHA) using distinct cut-off scores based on the underlying sample is a somewhat
arbitrary approach that has been criticized. Employing a combined score of defen-
siveness and anxiety (cf. Mendolia, 2002) can circumvent this issue and reanalysis of
our results with such index score and hierarchical regression analyses did not qual-
itatively change our results, but lowered statistical power in some of the analyses.
For reasons of clarity and to allow comparison with previous studies, we present
our results in the more conventional categorical fashion.
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Between-subject factors were anxiety (low/high) and defensiveness
(low/high).
To control for possible influences of individual compared to
small group testing conditions, we included presence/absence of
other participants at encoding or free-recall as a dummy-coded
categorical covariate in all analyses.
Responses faster than 200 ms or three standard deviations
above or below an individual’s mean response time were excluded
from all analyses. In the lexical decision task, priming was mea-
sured as the amount of time required to identify new words minus
the time required to identify old words. Collapsed across factor
levels, all dependent variables were normally distributed, assessed
with Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests. Our statistical significance level
was set to p< 0.05.
RESULTS
ENCODING TASK
Table 2 gives an overview on the encoding task results across all
three experiments.
As can be seen in Table 2, participants on average judged slightly
more than 50% of all words as self-descriptive and about 70% of
their judgments were favorable. The self-judgment ratio was above
zero in all experiments [experiment 1: t (94)= 4.2, p< 0.001,
Cohen’s d = 0.9; experiment 2: t (105)= 2.01, p< 0.05, d = 0.4;
experiment 3: t (98)= 2.95, p< 0.01, d = 0.6], indicating more
self-descriptive than not-self-descriptive judgments. Controlling
for presence/absence of other participants during the experi-
ment [experiment 1: F(1, 90)= 0.003, p> 0.1, ηpartial2 < 0.0001;
experiment 2: F(1, 101)= 0.74, p> 0.1, ηpartial2= 0.007; exper-
iment 3: F(1, 94)= 0.14, p> 0.1, ηpartial2= 0.001], this ratio
was not influenced by groupings of anxiety, defensiveness, or
their interaction in experiments 1 and 3 (all p’s> 0.1; all
ηpartial
2 < 0.02). However, anxiety grouping did show a main effect
in experiment 2 [F(1, 101)= 7.38, p< 0.01, ηpartial2= 0.07] indi-
cating more self-judgments than not-self-judgments in higher
anxious groups. There was no main effect of defensiveness
[F(1, 101)= 0.08, p> . 1, ηpartial2= 0.001] on the self-judgment
ratio and neither an interaction between anxiety and defen-
siveness [F(1, 101)= 0.30, p> 0.1, ηpartial2 < 0.003]. Thus, all
participants tended to make more self-descriptive than not-self-
descriptive judgments in all experiments, although this tendency
was attenuated in individuals with lower anxiety in experiment 2.
The positivity-judgment ratio was substantially above zero in
all experiments [experiment 1: t (94)= 17.21, p< 0.001, d = 3.55;
experiment 2: t (105)= 17.49, p< 0.001, d = 3.41; experiment
3: t (98)= 18.37, p< 0.001, d = 3.71], indicating more favorable
than unfavorable judgments in general. Controlling for pres-
ence/absence of other participants during the experiment [exper-
iment 1: F(1, 90)= 1.64, p> 0.1, ηpartial2= 0.02; experiment 2:
F(1, 101)= 0.18, p> 0.1, ηpartial2= 0.002; experiment 3: F(1,
94)= 0.96, p> 0.1, ηpartial2= 0.01], the positivity-judgment ratio
differed significantly across groups. Defensiveness showed main
effects in all three experiments [experiment 1: F(1, 90)= 11.9,
p< 0.001, ηpartial
2= 0.12; experiment 2: F(1, 101)= 8.15,
p< 0.01,ηpartial
2= 0.08; experiment 3: F(1, 94)= 10.29, p< 0.01,
ηpartial
2= 0.1], indicating more self-positive judgments in indi-
viduals with high defensiveness than in low-defensive individuals.
In addition, anxiety showed a main effect in experiment 2 only
[experiment 2: F(1, 101)= 20.0, p< 0.001, ηpartial2= 0.17] with
a less pronounced positivity-judgment ratio in high compared
to low anxiety groups. A significant interaction between anx-
iety and defensiveness grouping was observed in experiment 1
[F(1, 90)= 7.53, p< 0.01, ηpartial2= 0.08]. Following up on this
interaction, comparing all four separate groups with a one-way
ANOVA [F(3, 91)= 7.2, p< 0.001] and post hoc Scheffé tests
showed a significantly higher positivity-judgment ratio in the REP
group than in the LA group. While present in similar but weaker
form, the interaction did not reach significance in experiment 2
[F(1, 101)= 2.05, p> 0.1, ηpartial2= 0.02] or experiment 3 [F(1,
94)= 3.18, p< 0.1, ηpartial2= 0.033].
In summary, while all four groups showed a sizable preference
to make favorable self-judgments (endorsing positive words as self-
descriptive and rejecting negative words as not-self-descriptive),
this preference was reliably increased in higher defensive partic-
ipants across all experiments; and attenuated in individuals with
higher anxiety in experiment 2 only. In REP, this tendency had a
similar size across experiments and was, numerically, the largest
of each of the four groups in all experiments.
FREE-RECALL
Conditional on the self-descriptiveness judgments from the
encoding task, we then analyzed the proportions of words
retrieved in free-recall in each of the experiments, as a
function of within-subjects factors valence (positive/negative)
and prior self-judgment from the encoding task (self-
descriptive/not-self-descriptive), and between-subject factors anx-
iety (low/high) and defensiveness (low/high), again, controlling
for presence/absence of other participants during the experiment.
Means and standard deviations of proportional free-recall are
shown in Table 3.
In experiment 1 (immediate recall), controlling for the covari-
ate “presence/absence of other participants during the exper-
iment,” we observed a main effect of self-judgment [F(1,
90)= 10.10, p< 0.01, ηpartial2= 0.1], indicating better recall of
words that were previously judged as self-descriptive than words
that were judged as not-self-descriptive. Furthermore, we observed
a four-way interaction between valence, self-judgment, anxiety,
and defensiveness, just reaching significance [F(1, 90)= 4.23,
p< 0.05, ηpartial
2= 0.05]. To follow up on this interaction,
we first compared all four recall proportions across groups
with four one-way ANOVA. These were not significant [nega-
tive self-descriptive: F(1, 91)= 1.56, p= 0.21; negative not-self-
descriptive: F(1, 91)= 0.48, p= 0.7; positive self-descriptive: F(1,
91)= 0.72, p= 0.55; positive not-self-descriptive: F(1, 91)= 0.43,
p= 0.73]. Secondly, we conducted mixed repeated-measures
ANOVA within each of the four groups. Due to small cell
sizes the covariate was omitted for these analyses. We observed
main effects of self-judgment in LA [F(1, 21)= 9.5, p< 0.01,
ηpartial
2= 0.31], HA [F(1, 25)= 17.37, p< 0.001,ηpartial2= 0.41],
and DHA [F(1, 18)= 8.2, p< 0.01, ηpartial2= 0.31], indicating
better recall of self-descriptive than not-descriptive information.
This main effect was not present in REP [F(1, 27)= 1.07, p= 0.39,
ηpartial
2= 0.038]. Finally, dependent-samples t -tests were con-
ducted within each group (see Figure 1A for an illustration of
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Table 2 | Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of judgment proportions (out of 150 words) in the encoding task.
LA HA REP DHA Total
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
EXPERIMENT 1
Self 0.49 0.08 0.51 0.06 0.51 0.06 0.53 0.06 0.51 0.07
Not-self 0.47 0.08 0.44 0.07 0.45 0.06 0.44 0.06 0.45 0.07
Self-negativity 0.32 0.13 0.27 0.11 0.19 0.07 0.26 0.10 0.26 0.11
Self-positivity 0.63 0.14 0.69 0.10 0.77 0.07 0.71 0.10 0.71 0.12
Self-judgment ratio 0.06 0.35 0.14 0.29 0.12 0.23 0.17 0.24 0.12 0.28
Self-positivity ratio 0.72 0.68 1.02 0.55 1.45 0.45 1.08 0.58 1.09 0.12
EXPERIMENT 2
Self 0.48 0.07 0.52 0.09 0.49 0.06 0.52 0.07 0.50 0.08
Not-self 0.48 0.08 0.44 0.10 0.48 0.06 0.46 0.09 0.47 0.08
Self-negativity 0.27 0.05 0.33 0.12 0.20 0.09 0.30 0.12 0.27 0.11
Self-positivity 0.69 0.08 0.63 0.12 0.76 0.08 0.67 0.12 0.69 0.11
Self-judgment ratio −0.01 0.32 0.18 0.42 0.02 0.27 0.13 0.34 0.07 0.34
Self-positivity ratio 0.99 0.42 0.68 0.56 1.41 0.55 0.83 0.58 1.01 0.60
EXPERIMENT 3
Self 0.49 0.07 0.52 0.08 0.50 0.08 0.50 0.08 0.51 0.08
Not-self 0.47 0.07 0.45 0.09 0.46 0.09 0.46 0.09 0.46 0.08
Self-negativity 0.29 0.11 0.28 0.09 0.20 0.10 0.25 0.08 0.26 0.10
Self-positivity 0.67 0.12 0.69 0.09 0.76 0.11 0.71 0.09 0.71 0.11
Self-judgment ratio 0.06 0.31 0.16 0.35 0.10 0.40 0.09 0.35 0.10 0.35
Self-positivity ratio 0.87 0.60 0.95 0.47 1.42 0.63 1.10 0.48 1.07 0.58
Self: self-descriptive judgments; Not-self: not-self-descriptive judgments; Self-positivity: positive self-descriptive and negative not-self-descriptive judgments; Self-
negativity: positive not-self-descriptive and negative self-descriptive judgments; Self-judgment ratio: log-transformed self/not-self; Self-positivity ratio: log-transformed
self-positivity/self-negativity. LA, low-anxious; HA, high-anxious; REP, repressor; DHA, defensive high-anxious.
Table 3 | Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of recall proportions of words as they had been judged in encoding.
LA HA REP DHA Total
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
EXPERIMENT 1
Negative self 0.16 0.09 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.09 0.14 0.10
Negative not-self 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.10 0.05
Positive self 0.13 0.05 0.15 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.14 0.06
Positive not-self 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.08
EXPERIMENT 2
Negative self 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.08
Negative not-self 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03
Positive self 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.05
Positive not-self 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06
EXPERIMENT 3
Negative self 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08
Negative not-self 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.04
Positive self 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.05
Positive not-self 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07
Self: self-descriptive; Not-self: not-self-descriptive. LA, low-anxious; HA, high-anxious; REP, repressor; DHA, defensive high-anxious.
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FIGURE 1 | Differences in recall proportions of words previously judged
as self-descriptive minus words judged as not-self-descriptive. (A):
experiment 1, (B): experiment 2, (C): experiment 3. LA, low-anxious; HA,
high-anxious; REP, repressor; DHA, defensive high-anxious. Asterisks
indicate significantly better recall of self-descriptive compared to not
self-descriptive words.
the free-recall advantages due to self-descriptiveness and valence
in each group in experiment 1). We found that within the posi-
tive words, only HA individuals had a recall advantage of positive
self-descriptive compared to positive not-self-descriptive words
[t (25)= 4.85, p< 0.01, d = 1.94]. However, we observed better
recall of negative self-descriptive than negative not-self-descriptive
words in all groups except the REP group, differences with mod-
erate to large effect sizes [LA: t (21)= 3.00, p< 0.01, d = 1.31;
HA: t (25)= 2.14, p< 0.05, d = 0.86; DHA: t (18)= 2.66, p< 0.05,
d = 1.25]. The REP group was the only group without a significant
free-recall advantage for negative self-descriptive words over neg-
ative not-self-descriptive words in immediate recall [t (27)= 0.54,
p> 0.1, d = 0.21]. This result conceptually replicates Fujiwara
et al. (2008).
Would this differential recall pattern become more pronounced
with a delay? To answer this question and address hypothesis 2,
free-recall data from experiment 2 (delayed recall) was analyzed in
the same way (see Table 3; Figure 1B). Similar as in experiment 1,
we observed a main effect of self-judgment [F(1, 101)= 21.23,
p< 0.001, ηpartial
2= 0.17], controlling for the covariate “pres-
ence/absence of other participants during the experiment.” The
main effect indicated better recall of words that were previously
judged as self-descriptive compared to words that were judged
as not-self-descriptive. Furthermore, we found an interaction
between anxiety and defensiveness [F(1, 101)= 8.35, p< 0.01,
ηpartial
2= 0.08]. A one-way ANOVA comparing groups on over-
all recall proportions [F(1, 102)= 7.85, p< 0.05] and post hoc
Scheffé tests indicated that LA participants had better overall
free-recall than HA participants (LA: mean= 0.07± 0.03; HA:
mean= 0.05± 0.02). No further main effects or interactions were
observed. Specifically, there was no significant four-way inter-
action [F(1, 101)= 0.12, p> 0.1, ηpartial2= 0.001], contrary to
experiment 1. Of note, there were differences in experiments 1
and 2: we had detected anxiety main effects in both of judgment
ratios only in experiment 2, pointing to possible anxiety-based
differences in numbers of negative and positive items judged as
self-descriptive or not-self-descriptive in experiment 2. Thus, a
repeated-measures ANCOVA on free-recall proportions in exper-
iment 2 was conducted including both judgment ratios as covari-
ates. The results of this ANCOVA were similar: controlling for
the judgment ratios, the four-way interaction was still not sig-
nificant [F(1, 99)= 0.27, p> 0.1, ηpartial2= 0.003]. Thus, counter
to our second hypothesis, REP had no reduced recall of negative
self-descriptive information after the delay compared to any of
the other groups and we did not observe an exaggeration of the
within-group difference we had observed in experiment 1.
Experiment 3 (delayed recall with priming), which was
intended to prime potential recall failures for unfavorable infor-
mation in REP, is presented next (cf. Table 3; Figure 1C). Control-
ling for the covariate “presence/absence of other participants dur-
ing the experiment,” we observed a main effect of self-judgment
[F(1, 94)= 12.08, p< 0.001, ηpartial2= 0.11], indicating better
recall of words that were previously judged as self-descriptive
than words that were judged as not-self-descriptive. Although
this effect was similar to that observed in experiments 1 and
2, the effect size was smaller. The main effect was qualified by
a four-way interaction between valence, self-judgment, anxiety,
and defensiveness [F(1, 94)= 4.97, p< 0.05, ηpartial2= 0.05]. Fol-
lowing up on this interaction, there were no between-group
differences in any of the four recall proportions [negative self-
descriptive: F(3, 95)= 1.23, p> 0.1; negative not-self-descriptive:
F(3, 95)= 1.39, p> 0.1; positive self-descriptive: F(3, 95)= 0.54,
p> 0.1; positive not-self-descriptive: F(3, 95)= 1.89, p> 0.1].
Secondly, we conducted the mixed repeated-measures ANOVA
within each of the four groups separately. The main effect
of self-judgment was only present in REP [F(1, 22)= 11.36,
p< 0.01, ηpartial
2= 0.34], but not in LA [F(1, 26)= 1.32, p> 0.1,
ηpartial
2= 0.04], HA [F(1, 27)= 1.53, p> 0.1, ηpartial2= 0.05], or
DHA [F(1, 20)= 2.75, p> 0.1, ηpartial2= 0.12]. Finally, within-
group paired t -tests showed that REP participants were the only
group with a significant recall advantage for self-descriptive over
not-self-descriptive words, for both negative words [t (22)= 2.23,
p< 0.05, d = 0.95] and positive words [t (22)= 3.38, p< 0.01,
d = 1.44; see also Figure 1C], and both these differences had
large effect sizes. HA showed such self-descriptiveness advantage
in recall only for negative words [t (27)= 2.63, p< 0.05, d = 1.01],
but not positive words [t (27)=−0.19, p> 0.5, d =−0.07], DHA
only for positive words [t (20)= 2.33, p< 0.05, d = 1.04], but
not negative words [t (20)=−0.06, p> 0.5, d =−0.004]. The
LA group showed neither significant self-descriptiveness advan-
tage in recall [negative: t (26)= 0.22, p> 0.5, d = 0.09; positive:
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t (26)= 1.85, p< 0.1, d= 0.73], although approaching signifi-
cance for positive words. Thus, the priming task evoked the
strongest self-descriptiveness advantage in subsequent recall in
REP, regardless of word valence.
PRIMING
Word identification accuracy in the lexical decision task in
experiment 3 was close to ceiling (proportions of 0.92± 0.05
of all items were correctly identified), did not differ between
groups, and was therefore not analyzed further. Priming scores,
subtracting response times to words from the encoding task
from response times to new words, were analyzed, again as
a function of valence (positive/negative), prior self-judgment
(self-descriptive/not-self-descriptive), anxiety (high/low), and
defensiveness (high/low). Controlling for the covariate “pres-
ence/absence of other participants during the experiment,” we
found main effects of valence [F(1, 94)= 14.41, p< 0.001,
ηpartial
2= 0.13] and self-judgment [F(1, 94)= 10.48, p< 0.01,
ηpartial
2= 0.10]. Participants showed more priming for nega-
tive words [mean= 25.07 ms (SE= 3.2 ms)] than for positive
words [mean= 9.57 ms (SE= 3.74 ms)] and more priming for
self-descriptive words [mean= 22.54 ms (SE= 3.41 ms)] than for
not-self-descriptive words [mean= 12.1 ms (SE= 2.87 ms)]. No
further main effects or interactions were observed. The four-
way interaction involving valence, self, anxiety, and defensiveness
was far from significant [F(1, 94)= 0.4, p> 0.5, ηpartial2= 0.004].
Thus, anxiety, defensiveness or their interaction did not influence
priming performance at the delay.
DISCUSSION
Repressors were the only group without a recall advantage for
negative words they had previously judged as self-descriptive
compared to words they had not endorsed as self-descriptive in
experiment 1. This replicates our previous results (Fujiwara et al.,
2008) in an independent sample, despite the fact that in the cur-
rent setting we used three times as many words, a more gradual
4-point self-judgment scale and only a self-judgment task (but
no valence-judgment task). The gradual 4-point scale was used
to allow more nuanced self-descriptiveness judgments than sim-
ple yes/no answers. By having less extreme options available we
intended to allow participants to be more realistic in their self-
judgments and intended to test more graded self-descriptiveness
effects on memory. While we had to combine the 4-point answers
into two categories (self-descriptive and not-self-descriptive) to
avoid excessive loss of data, this type of answering during the
encoding task critically differs from the simple two options during
encoding in Fujiwara et al. (2008) and could have altered par-
ticipants’ experience during encoding in the current experiment.
This suggests that although the effect is small, it appears to be real.
However, counter to our second hypothesis, this relatively lowered
recall for negative self-descriptive information within the repres-
sor group did not become more pronounced in free-recall after a
2-day delay in experiment 2. Note also that repressors consistently
had the highest positivity-judgment ratio in each study, but only
in study 1 did we see their relatively reduced recall.
We had good reasons to expect that self-descriptiveness may
increase repressors’ recall biases over a delay. Hock and Krohne
(Hock and Krohne, 2004; Krohne and Hock, 2008; Peters et al.,
2012) found that repressors recalled threat-related information
less than non-repressor groups only after a delay. The definition
of repressive coping style by Weinberger (1990; Weinberger et al.,
1979) states that individuals with a repressive coping style are not
just sensitive to any threat but particularly to threat directed at
their positive self-view. Various findings (e.g., in thought suppres-
sion or directed forgetting paradigms; Myers et al., 1998; Barnier
et al., 2004; Myers and Derakshan, 2004) also point to a particular
vulnerability of repressors to self-related threat. Our own previ-
ous study (Fujiwara et al., 2008) also found no immediate recall
reductions in repressors for negative information that had simply
been judged with regard to valence, but recall reductions occurred
if encountered in a self-relevant encoding task.
There are several possible explanations why we did not observe
stronger self-serving memory biases over the delay in repressors.
First, the“threat” imposed by our task can reasonably be conceived
as mild although the results of experiment 1 imply that even this
mild threat was sufficient to show differential retrieval patterns
against negative self-descriptive information only in repressors.
Saunders et al. (2012) found that repressors are more prone to self-
serving recall distortions in mnemic neglect paradigms than non-
repressors, especially those with high anxiety levels. An important
difference in our procedure compared to mnemic neglect para-
digms is that here participants self-selected information as self-
descriptive or not-self-descriptive rather than being given hypo-
thetical self-view threatening feedback by the experimenter. Thus,
it is possible that in our study, a motivation to retrieve information
that had previously been deemed self-diagnostic superseded any
potential self-protective biases in memory, and perhaps even more
so after the delay. Secondly, our 2-day delay was (for practical rea-
sons) shorter by a day than that in Krohne and Hock’s work. Thus,
perhaps we did not detect self-serving recall biases in repressors
after the 2-day delay simply due to a truncated wait time before
such biases would emerge. However, we believe it is unlikely that
this difference caused the difference in results. Repressors after
2 days started to show a self-descriptiveness advantage in free-
recall, especially for positive words but also (non-significantly so)
for negative words. It is difficult to imagine how repressors would
first show a self-serving bias in immediate recall, which became
eliminated after a 2-day delay, and which would then be reinstated
or even exaggerated after 3 days.
Fading affect bias, a phenomenon describing faster decay of
information associated with negative emotional experiences com-
pared to positive emotions over time (Walker and Skowronski,
2009) may also have contributed to our results. After 2 days,
any potential threat experienced by repressors immediately post-
judgment, leading to immediate relative recall reductions for nega-
tive self-descriptive words, may have dissipated. To our knowledge,
the effects of a test delay on the self-descriptiveness effect as
tested in experiment 2 and 3 have not been reported previously.
However, self-reference effects in memory (superior memory for
information evaluated with reference to oneself, compared to
information evaluated with reference to someone else) tend to
become stronger over time (Symons and Johnson, 1997). Dif-
ferences in self-judgments (self-descriptive/not-self-descriptive)
explained 10% of the variance in free-recall at immediate test in
experiment 1. They explained 17% at the delayed test in experi-
ment 2, pointing to an increase of the self-descriptiveness effect in
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memory over a delay. Thus, self-descriptiveness effects, regard-
less of valence, may have counteracted any potential increase
in self-serving memory biases in repressors over time. Results
of experiment 3 can be interpreted in favor of this explanation
as well. While cueing diminished self-descriptiveness effects in
free-recall in all non-repressor groups, mainly due to increasing
recall of not-self-descriptive information, repressors were the only
group retaining the self-descriptiveness effect after cueing. Per-
haps, repressors more so than any of the other groups, had been
reminded of information they had previously endorsed as per-
taining to themselves. They could have then used this information
to produce the most self-consistent recall pattern rather than a
positively biased one.
In this context, the assessment of coping styles using the BIDR-
SDE subscale in our studies may have played a critical role. The
BIDR-SDE subscale measures private, overconfident, egoistic self-
deception (Paulhus, 1991; Paulhus and John, 1998) rather than
outward-directed conformism to social norms as assessed with
the Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS; Crowne
and Marlowe, 1964), which is more commonly used in the repres-
sive coping style literature following Weinberger et al. (1979).
Repressors need to convince themselves and not just others of
their own invulnerability against anxiety (Weinberger et al., 1979;
Weinberger, 1990). Thus, the SDE part of the BIDR seemed bet-
ter suited to assess the repressive coping style than the MCSDS
(see also Weinberger and Davidson, 1994; Ashley and Holtgraves,
2003). However, individuals with high BIDR-SDE scores are also
characterized by mental rigidity. For example, they perseverate in
performing erroneous behavior in the face of failure (Peterson
et al., 2003). It appears possible then that our high BIDR-SDE
repressors may have reinterpreted initially self-devaluing infor-
mation in a more positive light over the delay and therefore might
have been well able to retrieve it, especially so when cued with
an innocuous priming task. Therefore, despite the normative rat-
ings used to select the words in this study (Anderson, 1968), it is
possible that some of the negative (unlikable) words indeed rep-
resented desirable characteristics to repressors, particularly after
some deliberation during the delay.
This interpretation does not run counter to Hock and Krohne’s
findings (Hock and Krohne, 2004; Krohne and Hock, 2008; Peters
et al., 2012). Rather it suggests that when assessing coping styles
in different ways, memories for valenced materials and self-related
materials decay differently over time depending on how repressive
coping style is measured and whether self-involvement is present.
Avoidance of (anxiety-induced) arousal underlies repressive cop-
ing in the MCI. Hence, arousal-inducing information may not
be consolidated to the same extent in (MCI-)repressors than in
groups of non-repressors, which could result in decreased mem-
ory for such information over time. Conversely, when using the
BIDR-SDE to assess the defensiveness dimension of Weinberger’s
conceptualization of repressive coping, information inconsistent
with an over-positive self-view may become reinterpreted over
time and seems to remain accessible.
Future extensions of the current studies would need to incor-
porate both valence- and self-descriptiveness judgments to test
our suggestions. As such, one should assess whether repressors
indeed judge originally self-descriptive negative information in a
more positive way following a delay. Furthermore, the experiments
involved either individual or group testing settings. Even though
this seemed to have only minor influences on the results, it would
be optimal to keep the testing environment more consistent in
future studies, e.g., by only testing participants individually. An
important limitation in this field in general is the relatively arbi-
trary separation of coping style groups. This can be remedied by
using substantially larger samples and a continuous measure of
repressive coping (as suggested by Mendolia, 2002). Another way
to select repressive individuals might be to assess physiological
reactivity (e.g., after a stress induction task) in conjunction with
self-report, as done in some previous studies (e.g., Coifman et al.,
2007). Repressors selected this way would show normal to high
physiological reactivity in conjunction with an under-reporting
of the stress experience, which is at the core of Weinberger’s
characterization of the repressive coping style.
CONCLUSION
In this set of studies, individuals with a repressive coping style
showed selectively lowered immediate recall of negative self-
descriptive information, but not after a 2-day delay. This result
may seem to run counter to suggestions of repressors having an
exaggerated bias against retrieving negative memories after a delay.
However, we suggest that repressors, at least when assessed accord-
ing to Weinberger’s classification scheme, may reinterpret initially
negative self-relevant information in a more positive light after a
delay, and therefore no longer experience the need to bias their
recall at a delay.
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